Saudi Foreign Policy: Normalization, BRICS, GCC Unity, Iran Rapprochement, and the China Pivot

Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman represents a departure from the cautious, consensus-driven diplomatic tradition that characterized the kingdom for decades. Where previous Saudi leaders maintained stability through quiet diplomacy, conservative alliance management, and the avoidance of dramatic departures from established relationships, MBS has pursued an activist foreign policy that simultaneously engages with the United States and China, normalizes with Israel while championing Palestinian statehood, joins BRICS while maintaining the traditional Western alliance framework, and reestablishes diplomatic relations with Iran while competing with Tehran for regional influence. This multi-directional diplomacy reflects a strategic calculation that Saudi Arabia’s growing economic weight, energy market influence, and regional centrality allow it to maintain relationships across geopolitical divides rather than choosing sides. The foreign policy choices the kingdom makes in the years leading to Expo 2030 will shape the diplomatic environment in which 197 nations participate in the most ambitious World Expo in history.

The Normalization Question: Israel, Palestine, and the Abraham Accords

The prospect of Saudi-Israeli normalization represents the most consequential diplomatic prize in the Middle East and one of the most complex challenges of MBS’s foreign policy agenda. The Abraham Accords of 2020, which established diplomatic relations between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, created a diplomatic framework that brought Saudi normalization from the realm of speculation to the realm of active negotiation.

Saudi Arabia’s approach to normalization has been characterized by a combination of strategic interest and political caution. The strategic interest is clear: normalization with Israel would strengthen the Saudi-American relationship, unlock technology and intelligence cooperation with Israel, create economic opportunities in tourism, technology, and investment, and position Saudi Arabia at the center of a new regional alignment. The economic dimension is particularly relevant to Vision 2030—Israeli technology companies, venture capital, and innovation ecosystems could contribute to Saudi Arabia’s diversification agenda in ways that existing relationships cannot.

The political caution reflects the sensitivity of the Palestinian question in Saudi and broader Arab public opinion. Unlike the smaller Gulf states that normalized through the Abraham Accords, Saudi Arabia’s custodianship of Islam’s holiest sites—Mecca and Medina—gives it a unique symbolic position in the Muslim world that makes unilateral normalization without progress on Palestinian statehood politically fraught. The Saudi position has consistently linked normalization to meaningful progress on Palestinian rights, including a credible pathway to Palestinian statehood.

The October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent military operations in Gaza fundamentally disrupted the normalization timeline. The scale of civilian casualties in Gaza made it politically impossible for Saudi Arabia to proceed with normalization in the near term, regardless of the strategic benefits. Saudi statements following the crisis reaffirmed the kingdom’s position that normalization requires a credible pathway to Palestinian statehood—a condition that the current Israeli government has shown no willingness to accept.

The normalization question remains open as of 2026, with diplomatic contacts continuing through multiple channels but no formal agreement in sight. The timeline for any eventual normalization is uncertain and will depend on the evolution of the Israeli-Palestinian situation, the disposition of the American administration, and the domestic political calculations in both Riyadh and Jerusalem. For Expo 2030, the normalization status will shape the diplomatic dynamics of Israeli participation and the broader Middle Eastern context of the event.

BRICS Membership: The Multipolar Bet

Saudi Arabia’s accession to BRICS—the expanded grouping that now includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Iran—represents one of the most significant diplomatic moves of MBS’s foreign policy. BRICS membership signals the kingdom’s strategic intent to diversify its diplomatic and economic relationships beyond the traditional Western alliance framework and to position itself as a bridge between the established economic order and the emerging multipolar system.

The decision to join BRICS was not a rejection of the Western alliance—Saudi Arabia maintains its security partnership with the United States, its economic relationships with Europe, and its participation in Western-led international institutions. Rather, it represents a hedging strategy that maximizes the kingdom’s diplomatic optionality in a world where the concentration of economic power is shifting eastward.

The economic rationale for BRICS membership is grounded in trade data. China is Saudi Arabia’s largest trading partner, purchasing approximately 20 percent of the kingdom’s oil exports. India is the second-largest destination for Saudi oil. The BRICS nations collectively represent a significant and growing share of global GDP, and the economic growth trajectories of China, India, and other BRICS members are projected to outpace those of the traditional Western economies in the coming decades.

BRICS membership also provides Saudi Arabia with a platform for influence in discussions about global economic governance, development finance, and the potential creation of alternative payment systems that reduce dependence on the US dollar. While the practical institutional achievements of BRICS remain limited, the grouping’s symbolic significance as a forum for non-Western economic coordination is growing, and Saudi Arabia’s participation ensures it has a seat at the table.

The geopolitical implications of BRICS membership are complex. The grouping includes countries with fundamentally different political systems, economic models, and strategic interests. Saudi Arabia sits in BRICS alongside Iran—its historic regional rival—and Russia—a country under Western sanctions for its invasion of Ukraine. Managing these relationships within the BRICS framework requires diplomatic sophistication that reflects the kingdom’s growing confidence in its ability to navigate between competing power blocs.

For Expo 2030, BRICS membership provides additional diplomatic channels for engaging with participating nations and reinforces the narrative that Saudi Arabia is a global convening power rather than a country aligned exclusively with any single bloc. The inclusion of major emerging economies in the kingdom’s diplomatic network supports the Expo’s aspiration to be a truly global event rather than a Western or Arab-centric one.

The China Pivot: Economic Partnership and Strategic Ambiguity

Saudi Arabia’s deepening relationship with China represents the most consequential shift in the kingdom’s external orientation since the establishment of the US-Saudi relationship in the 1940s. The China-Saudi relationship has expanded rapidly across economic, technological, diplomatic, and increasingly strategic dimensions, reshaping the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East.

The economic dimension is most advanced. China is Saudi Arabia’s largest single-country trading partner, and the trade relationship extends beyond oil to encompass infrastructure, technology, telecommunications, and consumer goods. Chinese companies are active participants in Saudi Arabia’s construction boom, providing equipment, materials, and in some cases direct construction services for Vision 2030 projects. Huawei has a significant presence in Saudi telecommunications infrastructure. Chinese electric vehicle manufacturers are exploring the Saudi market as the kingdom develops its automotive sector.

The diplomatic milestone of the China-brokered Iran rapprochement in March 2023—in which Beijing facilitated the restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran after a seven-year rupture—demonstrated China’s growing diplomatic influence in the Middle East and Saudi Arabia’s willingness to accept Chinese mediation in matters of critical national security interest. The agreement, announced in Beijing rather than Washington, was interpreted worldwide as evidence of a strategic realignment in which China was displacing the United States as the preferred diplomatic broker for Gulf security issues.

The technology dimension of the China-Saudi relationship is particularly significant for the kingdom’s diversification agenda. Saudi Arabia’s investments in AI, data centers, and digital infrastructure have included partnerships with Chinese technology companies. PIF’s $5 billion investment in DataVolt data centers at NEOM and the broader Saudi interest in AI infrastructure create potential points of technological engagement with China that intersect with US concerns about technology transfer and competition.

The strategic dimension of the China-Saudi relationship remains characterized by ambiguity. Saudi Arabia has not entered into a formal defense alliance with China, and the US remains the kingdom’s primary security partner. However, Saudi engagement with Chinese military technology—including the purchase of ballistic missiles and reports of drone technology cooperation—has generated friction with Washington. The kingdom’s strategic calculus appears to be that maintaining relationships with both Washington and Beijing maximizes leverage with each while avoiding the constraints of exclusive alignment with either.

The Iran Rapprochement: Diplomacy After Seven Years of Rupture

The restoration of Saudi-Iranian diplomatic relations in March 2023, following seven years of rupture, represents one of the most significant diplomatic developments in the Middle East in decades. The agreement, brokered by China, committed both countries to the restoration of ambassadorial-level relations, the reopening of embassies, and the activation of existing cooperation agreements on trade, investment, technology, and culture.

The Saudi-Iranian rupture had originated in January 2016, when Saudi Arabia executed the Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, triggering protests in Iran during which the Saudi embassy in Tehran was attacked. Saudi Arabia severed diplomatic relations in response, and the two countries subsequently found themselves on opposing sides of regional conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq.

The rapprochement reflects a strategic recalculation on both sides. For Saudi Arabia, the restoration of relations with Iran reduces the risk of regional conflict that could disrupt Vision 2030’s implementation, creates potential economic opportunities in trade and investment, and demonstrates the kingdom’s diplomatic independence by pursuing reconciliation with an adversary without requiring American approval or mediation. For Iran, the restoration of relations with its wealthiest neighbor offers economic benefits, diplomatic legitimacy, and a reduction in the regional isolation that sanctions have intensified.

The durability and depth of the rapprochement remain uncertain. The underlying competitions between Saudi Arabia and Iran—for regional influence, for the allegiance of Shia and Sunni populations, for energy market share—have not been resolved by the restoration of diplomatic relations. The conflicts in Yemen and Syria, in which the two countries have supported opposing sides, continue in various forms. And the domestic political dynamics in both countries create constituencies that benefit from rivalry rather than reconciliation.

For Expo 2030, the Iran rapprochement has practical significance. Iran is expected to participate in the Expo as one of 197 nations, and the diplomatic relationship between the host country and Iran will shape the dynamics of that participation. A stable, if limited, diplomatic relationship provides the foundation for Iran’s engagement with the Expo; a renewed rupture would create diplomatic complications that could affect the event’s universal participation aspirations.

GCC Unity: Solidarity and Competition

Saudi Arabia’s relationships within the Gulf Cooperation Council—comprising Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar—represent the most immediate layer of the kingdom’s foreign policy architecture. The GCC relationships combine elements of solidarity, competition, and the management of intra-Gulf dynamics that have grown more complex under Vision 2030.

The resolution of the Qatar blockade in January 2021—after a three-and-a-half-year diplomatic crisis during which Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt severed diplomatic and economic ties with Qatar—restored formal GCC unity. The AlUla Declaration, signed at the 41st GCC Summit, committed member states to solidarity and non-interference. However, the underlying tensions that produced the blockade—including competition for regional influence, differing positions on political Islam, and the growing economic rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE—have not been entirely resolved.

The Saudi-UAE relationship is the most consequential and most complex within the GCC. The two countries share a broadly aligned vision of economic diversification and regional modernization, and they have cooperated on numerous diplomatic and security issues. However, they are increasingly direct economic competitors, particularly in financial services, tourism, logistics, and the attraction of international business. Dubai’s established position as the Gulf’s business hub faces growing competition from Riyadh’s ambitious expansion, and the two cities’ rivalry for international headquarters, skilled workers, and investment is intensifying.

The GCC collectively represents an economic bloc with a total GDP of $2.37 trillion, of which Saudi Arabia accounts for 53 percent. If considered as a single economic entity, the GCC would rank approximately 10th globally—a measure of the collective economic weight that underpins the bloc’s diplomatic influence. Saudi Arabia’s dominant share of the GCC economy provides it with structural leadership of the bloc, but the management of intra-GCC relationships requires ongoing diplomatic attention.

For Expo 2030, GCC unity is practically important. The Gulf states are expected to be among the most prominent participants in the Expo, and the quality of intra-GCC relationships will influence the diplomatic atmosphere of the event. The previous hosting of Expo 2020 by Dubai in the UAE provides both a benchmark—expectations against which Riyadh’s Expo will be measured—and a lesson in how Gulf states can leverage world expos for national positioning.

The American Relationship: Evolution and Recalibration

The US-Saudi relationship—historically anchored in the oil-for-security bargain established during World War II—is undergoing a recalibration that reflects changing energy markets, shifting American strategic priorities, and Saudi Arabia’s growing diplomatic independence. The relationship remains the most important single bilateral relationship for Saudi Arabia’s security, but it is no longer the exclusive or dominant framework within which Saudi foreign policy operates.

American concerns about Saudi Arabia range from human rights issues to the kingdom’s relationships with China and Russia. Congressional scrutiny of the US-Saudi relationship intensified following the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 and the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen. Arms sales, intelligence cooperation, and the terms of the security relationship have all been subject to congressional debate and, in some cases, legislative action.

Saudi Arabia’s response to these pressures has been to diversify its diplomatic and security relationships while maintaining the core elements of the American partnership. The kingdom has pursued defense technology relationships with China, invested in domestic defense industrial capacity through the General Authority for Military Industries and the Saudi Arabian Military Industries company, and demonstrated willingness to make energy production decisions—within OPEC+ frameworks—that do not align with American preferences.

The evolving American relationship has implications for Expo 2030. American participation in the Expo—the scale of the US pavilion, the level of official American engagement, and the diplomatic messaging around the event—will be shaped by the state of the bilateral relationship at the time. Saudi Arabia’s ability to host an Expo that is perceived as genuinely global rather than aligned with any particular power bloc depends in part on managing the American relationship effectively alongside the kingdom’s expanding Asian and Global South partnerships.

Expo 2030 as Diplomatic Platform

The BIE vote that awarded Expo 2030 to Riyadh was itself a diplomatic event of the first order. The kingdom secured 119 votes out of 182 member nations—a landslide that reflected both the substantive strength of the bid and Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic weight. Busan, South Korea received 29 votes and Rome received 17, making the outcome one of the most decisive in BIE history.

The diplomatic mobilization behind the Expo bid demonstrated Saudi Arabia’s capacity to marshal support across geographic, political, and economic divides. The 119 nations that voted for Riyadh spanned Africa, Asia, Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East—a coalition that no other bidder could match. This diplomatic breadth reflects the foreign policy strategy of maintaining relationships across all blocs rather than aligning exclusively with any single grouping.

Expo 2030 will serve as a platform for Saudi diplomatic engagement with 197 participating nations over 181 days—the most sustained multilateral diplomatic event the kingdom has ever hosted. The bilateral meetings, summits, cultural exchanges, and business forums that accompany a world expo provide diplomatic opportunities that extend far beyond the formal Expo program. For a kingdom seeking to position itself as a global convening power, the Expo represents six months of sustained diplomatic engagement at an unprecedented scale.

The theme—“The Era of Change: Together for a Foresighted Tomorrow”—positions the Expo as a forward-looking platform for global cooperation rather than a showcase for any single ideology or political system. The sub-themes of Transformational Technology, Sustainable Solutions, and Prosperous People provide thematic frameworks within which diplomatic conversations about trade, investment, technology transfer, environmental cooperation, and development assistance can be conducted.

The foreign policy dimensions of Expo 2030 extend to every aspect of the event—from the participating nations’ pavilion designs and thematic presentations to the diplomatic protocols governing official visits, from the bilateral agreements signed in the margins of the event to the media coverage that shapes international perceptions of the host country. Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy choices between now and October 2030 will determine whether the Expo takes place in a diplomatic environment characterized by broad international engagement and goodwill, or one complicated by unresolved conflicts, strained alliances, and the scrutiny that accompanies hosting a global event in a kingdom where governance, human rights, and transparency remain subjects of intense international debate.