MBS Reform Scorecard — Measuring the Crown Prince's Promises

MBS Reform Scorecard — Promises vs. Performance

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman launched Vision 2030 in April 2016 with a comprehensive set of promises that would, if delivered, fundamentally transform Saudi Arabia’s economy, society, and position in the world. A decade into the program, with the Expo 2030 milestone approaching, it is possible to conduct a rigorous assessment of which promises have been met, which remain in progress, and which have been quietly abandoned or significantly revised. This scorecard evaluates MBS’s reform record across five dimensions: economic diversification, social liberalization, cultural development, governance reform, and international positioning.

The scope of the assessment is deliberately comprehensive. Vision 2030 encompasses 1,502 total initiatives, of which 674 have been completed and 85 percent are classified as “on track” by the government’s own reporting framework. Cumulative investment since 2016 has exceeded $1.25 trillion. These are not numbers that can be dismissed as cosmetic — they represent a genuine, large-scale transformation effort that deserves rigorous evaluation against its own stated objectives.

The Pragmatic Pivot Context

Before examining individual reform dimensions, it is essential to note the strategic context of Q1 2026. Saudi Arabia has entered what Bloomberg characterized as a “new era of restraint on megaproject spend.” The NEOM suspension, the Red Sea Global Phase Two pause, and the PIF giga-project portfolio’s $8 billion write-down at end of 2024 represent a recalibration of ambition that affects how the reform scorecard should be interpreted.

Investment Minister Khalid Al Falih acknowledged the shift directly: “Priorities have arisen to which we cannot say no” — referring to the 2034 World Cup and 2030 Expo. This pragmatism represents a maturation of the reform program from its initial phase of unlimited ambition to a more disciplined phase of prioritized execution. The scorecard reflects both the achievements of the ambitious phase and the recalibrations of the pragmatic phase.

Economic Diversification

Promise: Reduce dependence on oil revenue, increase non-oil GDP contribution, grow the private sector, create millions of jobs for Saudi nationals, and build PIF into one of the world’s largest sovereign wealth funds.

Performance:

Non-oil activities now constitute 52 percent of GDP — the highest share in Saudi Arabia’s history, up from approximately 50 percent in 2016. Non-oil GDP growth reached 4.9 percent in 2025, with the non-oil sector contributing 2.8 percentage points to overall GDP growth of 4.5 percent. Non-oil government revenue has grown 113 percent from its 2016 baseline, reaching $137.29 billion (SAR 505.3 billion in 2025), and now represents 45 percent of total government revenue — a structural shift that reduces the Kingdom’s vulnerability to oil price fluctuations.

However, the non-oil GDP target remains behind schedule. The government fell $14 billion short of its non-oil GDP target, and non-oil exports as a percentage of non-oil GDP stand at 25.2 percent against a target of 35 percent — significantly behind. One analytically important critique: non-oil GDP growth in the period 2017-2024 was actually weaker than in the pre-Vision 2030 period of 2007-2015, suggesting that some of the diversification gains reflect government spending (through PIF and other entities) rather than autonomous private sector dynamism.

PIF has grown from approximately $160 billion to over $1 trillion in assets under management, crossing the trillion-dollar threshold in 2025. The revised target of $2.67 trillion by 2030 appears ambitious given current trajectory. Much of PIF’s growth reflects government asset transfers (including Saudi Aramco shares) and retained earnings rather than investment returns, and the fund’s actual investment performance is difficult to evaluate given limited public disclosure of unlisted portfolio valuations. The $8 billion write-down on the giga-project portfolio at end of 2024 highlighted the risk embedded in PIF’s domestic investments.

Private sector GDP contribution has reached 47 percent, exceeding the 2024 interim target. However, PIF-owned companies may be included in the “private sector” definition, potentially overstating true private sector contribution. The Saudi private sector continues to be dominated by conglomerates with government connections, and the startup ecosystem, while growing, has not yet produced the global-scale companies that would signal genuine economic transformation.

Employment has improved significantly for Saudi nationals. The Saudi unemployment rate achieved its 7 percent target in Q4 2024 — five years ahead of the 2030 deadline. Overall unemployment fell to 2.8 percent in Q1 2025, the lowest since records began in 1999. Female labor force participation has exceeded its 30 percent target ahead of schedule, reaching 36.3 percent in Q1 2025 (up from 19 percent in 2016), prompting a revised target of 40 percent by 2030. Female unemployment has fallen from 31.7 percent in 2018 to 10.5 percent in Q1 2025.

The economy’s overall performance has been strong: GDP reached $1.27 trillion in 2025 with 4.5 percent growth, and credit rating agencies have upgraded Saudi Arabia’s sovereign ratings (Moody’s Aa3, S&P A+, Fitch A+ stable). Saudi Arabia now accounts for 53 percent of the GCC’s $2.37 trillion combined GDP, and its inflation rate of 1.7 percent places it among top-performing G20 economies.

Score: B+ — Substantial progress on most economic metrics, with genuine structural change in some areas. The employment achievement (reaching the 7 percent target five years early) and non-oil revenue growth (113 percent increase) are the standout successes. Continued oil dependence and reliance on government-driven investment rather than autonomous private sector growth prevent a higher grade. FDI of $21 billion in 2024, down from $26 billion in 2023 and below the $29 billion target, represents the most concerning shortfall.

Social Liberalization

Promise: Transform Saudi society by expanding entertainment options, empowering women, reducing the power of the religious establishment, and creating a more open and tolerant social environment.

Performance:

Social liberalization has been the most dramatic and visible dimension of the reform program. The changes are genuinely transformative and have fundamentally altered daily life for Saudi citizens:

• Cinemas reopened (April 2018) after a 35-year ban; over 600 screens now operating
• Women allowed to drive (June 2018), ending one of the world’s most recognized gender restrictions
• Women allowed to attend sporting events (January 2018)
• Entertainment sector created essentially from scratch, with concerts, festivals, and cultural events now commonplace — the General Authority for Entertainment, established in May 2016, has invested over $2 billion
• First public live music concert in Riyadh in over 25 years (May 2017)
• Guardianship system reformed (August 2019), giving women greater legal autonomy — including independent passport applications, travel without male permission, access to healthcare and education, and independent medical decisions
• Mixed-gender social events normalized
• Religious police (mutaween) stripped of enforcement powers
• Tourist visa introduced (September 2019), opening the country to visitors from 49 countries — enabling record arrivals of 30 million foreign tourists in 2024
• Music, art, theater, and film industries developing rapidly
• Six Flags Qiddiya City opened December 31, 2025 — the first Six Flags outside North America since 2004, with 28 rides and five world records
• Esports World Cup launched in Riyadh (2024)
• Aquarabia Water Park opened March 19, 2026

The speed and scale of social liberalization is unprecedented in Saudi history and arguably in the modern history of conservative societies. Women’s workforce participation has surged from 19 percent to 36.3 percent — an achievement that S&P projects will add $39 billion (3.5 percent of GDP) to the economy by 2032 if growth continues. Women now constitute over 40 percent of STEM students in Saudi universities.

However, the social liberalization has been selective and top-down. Political dissent, independent media, and civil society activism remain heavily constrained. Human rights organizations document ongoing restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly, and association. The persecution of dissidents — most notably the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018 — casts a shadow over the reform narrative. Several women’s rights activists who advocated for the very reforms that were subsequently implemented remain imprisoned or subject to travel bans, including Salma al-Shehab (sentenced to 34 years for peaceful social media activity) and Nourah al-Qahtani (sentenced to 45 years). An investigation reported over 21,000 workers allegedly died on Vision 2030-related projects between 2017 and 2024.

Saudi Arabia’s Global Gender Gap ranking has improved but remains 132nd as of 2025 — a reminder that legal reforms have not yet translated into full gender parity. Freedom House continues to rate Saudi Arabia as “Not Free.”

Score: A- for social/cultural liberalization; D for political/civil rights — The divergence between social liberalization and political control is the most striking feature of the reform program and the most difficult tension for international audiences to reconcile.

Cultural Development

Promise: Develop a vibrant cultural sector, invest in arts and heritage, build museums and cultural venues, and position Saudi Arabia as a cultural destination.

Performance:

Cultural development has exceeded most expectations. The Ministry of Culture’s 16-sector strategy has produced visible results across film, visual arts, music, heritage preservation, culinary arts, and performing arts. Saudi artists are gaining international recognition. Film production has gone from zero to approximately 30 feature films annually. Heritage sites are being conserved and developed for tourism. Cultural festivals and events animate cities year-round.

The investment in cultural infrastructure — Diriyah Gate ($63 billion master plan with Bujairi Terrace operational and 20,000 daily workers on site), AlUla, Hayy Jameel, JAX District, Red Sea Film Festival — has created institutions and venues that provide platforms for cultural production and consumption. The emergence of a Saudi creative class — artists, filmmakers, musicians, designers, chefs — represents a genuine cultural flowering that enriches national life and creates economic opportunity.

Diriyah Gate deserves particular mention as a cultural achievement. Its Najdi-inspired architecture, UNESCO World Heritage Site conservation program, and integration of dining, hospitality, and heritage create a cultural destination that is genuinely world-class and distinctively Saudi. The $2 billion Wadi Safar contract and the forthcoming hotel openings (Langham, Chedi, Rosewood, Orient Express) will further strengthen its cultural offering before Expo 2030.

Score: A — Cultural development is arguably the most successful dimension of the reform program, delivering tangible results that enhance quality of life, international perception, and economic diversification.

Governance Reform

Promise: Improve government efficiency, reduce corruption, enhance transparency, and modernize regulatory frameworks.

Performance:

Governance reform presents a mixed picture. On the positive side, government services have been digitized extensively — Saudi Arabia now ranks in the top 10 globally for digital government services, approaching the top-5 target. Regulatory frameworks for business have been modernized, including a new investment law (2024) and new property ownership system broadening permissions for non-Saudis (effective early 2026). The Council of Economic and Development Affairs (CEDA), chaired by MBS, has centralized supervisory responsibility over domestic social, economic, and development matters, enabling faster decision-making.

The anti-corruption campaign (launched in November 2017 with the detention of hundreds of princes and businessmen at the Ritz-Carlton Riyadh) recovered an estimated $100+ billion in settlements. VAT was introduced at 5 percent in 2018 and tripled to 15 percent in 2020, creating a new revenue stream. Energy and utilities repricing, combined with the Citizen’s Account cash transfer program to protect vulnerable households, represented genuine fiscal modernization.

On the negative side, the anti-corruption campaign was widely criticized for its extrajudicial methods, lack of due process, and apparent use as a tool for political consolidation rather than genuine institutional reform. Transparency of government finances, PIF investment decisions, and giga-project budgets remains limited by international standards. Power has been increasingly concentrated in the Crown Prince’s office — MBS was appointed Prime Minister in September 2022, consolidating executive authority — reducing the checks and balances that, while never strong in Saudi Arabia, previously provided some constraint on executive authority.

Score: B- for administrative efficiency; C- for transparency and institutional governance — Genuine improvements in government service delivery and fiscal modernization coexist with increased concentration of power and limited institutional accountability.

International Positioning

Promise: Transform Saudi Arabia from a regionally focused monarchy into a global player in diplomacy, investment, sports, tourism, and cultural exchange.

Performance:

International positioning has been transformed, though the results are uneven. Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic influence has expanded through mediation efforts (Yemen, Sudan), multilateral engagement (G20 presidency in 2020, BRICS membership), and mega-event hosting wins that are unprecedented in scale: Expo 2030 (winning the BIE vote with 119 of 182 member votes), FIFA World Cup 2034, and Esports World Cup. The Kingdom’s economic footprint has grown through PIF’s global investments, and its cultural visibility has increased through sports events, entertainment, and tourism.

The soft power investment has been staggering — an estimated $45-63 billion since 2016 across sports, entertainment, tourism marketing, cultural diplomacy, development aid, and mega-event hosting. PIF’s acquisition of Newcastle United, the creation of LIV Golf, and the Saudi Pro League’s recruitment of stars like Cristiano Ronaldo have generated global media exposure at scale.

However, international perceptions remain deeply divided. While some audiences (particularly in the Global South, younger demographics, and business communities) view Saudi Arabia more positively than a decade ago, others (human rights advocates, Western media, and civil society organizations) remain highly critical. The Khashoggi killing, ongoing human rights concerns, and the “sportswashing” counter-narrative create persistent reputational headwinds that limit the effectiveness of soft power investments.

Tourism data provides behavioral evidence of perception shift: 122 million visitors in 2025, with European arrivals growing 14 percent and East Asia Pacific arrivals growing 15 percent in the first nine months. International visitor spending surged over 20 percent in Q1 2025. People are voting with their wallets to visit Saudi Arabia regardless of media narratives — a fact that matters more than opinion polls.

Score: B — Significant progress in expanding international presence and influence, constrained by persistent reputational challenges that money and mega-events alone cannot fully resolve.

Overall Assessment

The MBS reform scorecard reveals a transformation that is genuinely impressive in its scope and speed, but deeply contradictory in its nature. Saudi Arabia in 2026 is a dramatically different country from Saudi Arabia in 2016 — more open socially, more diverse economically, more engaged culturally, and more visible internationally. But it is also more politically concentrated, less tolerant of dissent, and more reliant on state-directed investment than the Vision 2030 blueprint originally implied.

The pragmatic pivot of 2025-2026 adds a new dimension to the assessment. The willingness to suspend NEOM construction, scale back Red Sea Global Phase Two, absorb an $8 billion portfolio write-down, and redirect resources toward Expo 2030 and FIFA 2034 demonstrates a capacity for strategic adjustment that the original Vision 2030 presentation — with its air of inevitability — did not suggest. This pragmatism is itself a reform achievement, even if it involves acknowledging that some original promises were overambitious.

For Expo 2030, the reform scorecard matters because the Expo will be the moment when the world arrives to evaluate Saudi Arabia’s transformation firsthand. Visitors will experience the entertainment, the cultural offerings, the infrastructure, and the hospitality that represent the reform program’s tangible achievements. But they will also arrive with awareness of the reform program’s contradictions and limitations, and the Expo’s narrative must be sophisticated enough to acknowledge the complexity of Saudi Arabia’s transformation rather than presenting a simplified success story.

Quantitative Scorecard Summary

The following table summarizes key metrics across the five reform dimensions, providing a data-driven snapshot of where the reform program stands a decade into implementation.

The Accountability Gap

One striking feature of the MBS reform program is the absence of formal accountability mechanisms. Vision 2030 was launched with specific targets, timelines, and metrics — 23 major KPIs have been analyzed, with 57 percent on track or ahead, 26 percent behind but progressing, and 17 percent at risk of missing — but there is no independent body charged with evaluating progress, no regular public reporting against targets (beyond selective announcements of favorable metrics), and no consequences for missed targets beyond internal government review.

This accountability gap is consequential for Expo 2030 because international media, think tanks, and advocacy organizations will inevitably compile their own scorecards in the lead-up to the event. The absence of a credible official accounting creates space for critical assessments that emphasize missed targets and unfulfilled promises. A proactive transparency strategy — publishing a comprehensive, honest progress report before the Expo opens — would preempt the most damaging critiques and demonstrate the kind of institutional maturity that international audiences respect.

The government’s own framework acknowledges areas of underperformance. Renewable energy deployment is “significantly behind” and represents one of the most at-risk targets. No Saudi city has achieved the Global Livability Ranking target. The Environmental Performance Index ranking of 108th (against a target of 70th) suggests that the sustainability narrative surrounding Expo 2030 and the Saudi Green Initiative faces credibility challenges that metrics-focused international observers will identify.

The Reform Program’s Legacy

The reform program’s legacy will ultimately be determined not by the scorecard at any single point in time but by the direction and sustainability of the changes initiated. On this measure, the trajectory is clearly positive: Saudi Arabia in 2026 is a fundamentally different country from Saudi Arabia in 2016, and the changes — social liberalization, economic diversification, cultural development, international engagement — show no signs of reversal.

The question is not whether MBS has reformed Saudi Arabia but whether the reforms are deep enough, broad enough, and institutionally embedded enough to survive beyond the tenure of any single leader. The concentration of decision-making authority in one individual — while enabling the speed and decisiveness that has characterized the reform program — creates institutional fragility that more distributed governance structures would avoid.

The most honest assessment of MBS’s reform program is that it has accomplished more than most observers expected and less than its own rhetoric promised. It has changed Saudi Arabia irreversibly, but it has not resolved the fundamental tension between modernization and control that defines the Saudi experiment. The next four years — and the Expo that caps them — will determine which trend ultimately prevails.

The cumulative evidence — $1.25 trillion invested, 674 initiatives completed, unemployment at record lows, women’s participation nearly doubled, 122 million tourism visitors, GDP at $1.27 trillion, credit ratings upgraded — constitutes a body of achievement that commands analytical respect regardless of ideological perspective. The simultaneous evidence — political prisoners, concentrated power, accountability gaps, environmental underperformance, FDI shortfalls — constitutes a body of concerns that prevents the reform program from claiming unqualified success. Both sets of evidence will be on display when the world arrives in Riyadh in October 2030.